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ABSTRACT
INSIGHTS INTO USER BEHAVIOR IN DEALING
WITH COMMON INTERNET ATTACKS
Utku Ozan Yılmaz
M.S. in Computer Engineering
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Aydın Selc¸uk
July, 2011
The Internet’s immense popularity has made it an attractive medium for attack-
ers. Today, criminals often make illegal profits by targeting Internet users. Most
common Internet attacks require some form of user interaction such as clicking
on an exploit link, or dismissing a security warning dialogue. Hence, the security
problem at hand is not only a technical one, but it also has a strong human
aspect. Although the security community has proposed many technical solutions
to mitigate common Internet attacks, the behavior of users when they face these
attacks remains a largely unexplored area.
In this work, we describe an online experiment platform we built for testing
the behavior of users when they are confronted with common, concrete attack
scenarios such as reflected cross-site scripting, session fixation, scareware and
file sharing scams. We conducted experiments with more than 160 Internet users
with diverse backgrounds. Our findings show that non-technical users can exhibit
comparable performance to knowledgeable users at averting relatively simple and
well-known threats (e.g., email scams). While doing so, they do not consciously
perceive the risk, but solely depend on their intuition and past experience (i.e.,
there is a training effect). However, in more sophisticated attacks, these non-
technical users often rely on misleading cues such as the “size” and “length” of
artifacts (e.g., URLs), and fail to protect themselves. Our findings also show that
trick banners that are common in file sharing websites and shortened URLs have
high success rates of deceiving non-technical users, thus posing a severe security
risk.
Keywords: Simulated attacks, internet security, user behavior.
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O¨ZET
YAYGIN I˙NTERNET SALDIRILARININ U¨STESI˙NDEN
GELMEDE KULLANICI DAVRANIS¸INA I˙C¸GO¨RU¨LER
Utku Ozan Yılmaz
Bilgisayar Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Aydın Selc¸uk
Temmuz, 2011
I˙nternetin yu¨ksek popu¨laritesi, onu saldırganlar ic¸in c¸ekici bir ortam haline
getirmis¸tir. Gu¨nu¨mu¨zde suc¸lular sık sık I˙nternet kullanıcılarını hedef alarak
yasadıs¸ı kazanc¸ sag˘lamaktadırlar. Birc¸ok yaygın I˙nternet saldırısı bir istismar
bag˘lantısına tıklamak ya da bir gu¨venlik uyarısı diyalog˘unu azletmek gibi birtakım
kullanıcı etkiles¸imlerine ihtiyac¸ duymaktadır. Bundan dolayı, eldeki gu¨venlik
problemi sadece teknik olmayıp gu¨c¸lu¨ bir insani yo¨ne de sahiptir. Gu¨venlik
toplulug˘u yaygın internet saldırılarını azaltmak ic¸in birc¸ok teknik c¸o¨zu¨m o¨nermis¸
olmasına rag˘men, kullanıcıların bu saldırılarla kars¸ılas¸tıklarındaki davranıs¸ları
bu¨yu¨k o¨lc¸u¨de kes¸fedilmemis¸ bir alan olmayı su¨rdu¨rmektedir.
Bu c¸alıs¸mada, kullanıcıların yansıyan siteler arası betik yazma, oturum
sabitleme, scareware ve dosya paylas¸ım dolandırıcılıkları gibi yaygın, somut saldırı
senaryolarıyla yu¨zles¸tiklerindeki davranıs¸larını test etmek ic¸in kurdug˘umuz bir
c¸evrimic¸i deney platformunu tanımlıyoruz. C¸es¸itli gec¸mis¸lere sahip 160’tan fa-
zla I˙nternet kullanıcısıyla deneyler yu¨ru¨ttu¨k. Bulgularımız, teknik olmayan kul-
lanıcıların go¨rece basit ve iyi bilinen tehditleri (o¨rneg˘in e-posta dolandırıcılıkları)
o¨nlemede bilgili kullanıcılarla kıyaslanabilir performanslar sergileyebildiklerini
go¨stermektedir. Bunu yaparken tehlikeyi bilinc¸li bir s¸ekilde idrak etmeyip,
yalnızca sezgilerine ve gec¸mis¸ deneyimlerine (yani bir eg˘itim etkisi var)
gu¨venmektedirler. Fakat, daha gelis¸mis¸ saldırılarda, bu kullanıcılar sıklıkla
yapıların (mesela URL’ler) “boyut” ve “uzunluk”ları gibi yanıltıcı ipuc¸larına
dayanmakta, ve kendilerini korumakta bas¸arısız olmaktadırlar. Bulgularımız
ayrıca, dosya paylas¸ım sitelerinde yaygın olan hile afis¸lerinin ve kısaltılmıs¸
URL’lerin, teknik olmayan kullanıcıları kandırmada yu¨ksek oranda bas¸arılı olduk-
larını, bu nedenle ciddi bir gu¨venlik tehlikesi yarattıklarını go¨stermektedir.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : Benzetimli saldırılar, internet gu¨venlig˘i, kullanıcı davranıs¸ı.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet has grown dramatically in the last twenty years and has changed the
way we communicate, do business, maintain friendships, and acquire information.
In fact, a study in 2008 showed that today’s youth are developing important social
and technical skills online [44]. It concluded that the learning process today is
becoming increasingly peer-based and networked, and that education needs to
be reconsidered in the 21st century. Without doubt, the Internet has become a
critical infrastructure, and any disruption in services adversely affects our lives
and causes significant damage (e.g., the recent Amazon EC2 cloud outage that
affected several Fortune 500 companies and millions of users [24]).
Clearly, as the importance of an information medium increases, so does its
attractiveness for criminal activity with the aim of making quick, illegal financial
gains. In fact, because of their high popularity and a user base that consists
of millions of Internet users, web applications have become primary targets for
attackers. According to SANS [37], attacks against web applications constitute
more than 60% of the total attack attempts observed on the Internet. Many web
applications are exploited every day to convert trusted websites into malicious
servers hosting client-side browser exploits. Once the victim’s machine has been
infected with malware, the attackers can then start collecting sensitive informa-
tion such as credit card numbers, passwords, and financial information. According
to SANS, most website owners fail to scan their applications for common flaws.
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In contrast, from an attacker’s point of view, automated tools designed to target
specific web application vulnerabilities simplify the discovery and mass infection
of websites.
Note that, although some types of attacks are technically very difficult for
users to detect and prevent (e.g., a stored form of a cross-site scripting attack [29]
on a popular social networking website), most Internet attacks actually require the
interaction of the user (e.g., by clicking on an exploit link, installing risky software,
failing to recognize a phishing website, ignoring an SSL certificate warning, etc.).
Hence, unfortunately, the user often becomes the weakest link in the chain, and
the attackers often rely on social engineering techniques to trick victims into
engaging in risky behavior, thus compromising their security.
To date, the security community has proposed many solutions to mitigate
current Internet threats such as botnets (e.g., [17, 34, 35]), malware (e.g., [18,
39, 62]), cross-site scripting (e.g., [61]), cross-site request forgery (e.g., [19]), and
drive by download exploits (e.g., [47]). However, although it is clear that the
problems at hand are not only technical (i.e., there is a strong human aspect as
some form of user interaction is typically required for many of these attacks to
be successful), existing literature is sparse, and there have not been many works
that attempt to shed light on how Internet users are able to cope with concrete
attacks.
In [26], Dhamija et al. attempted to understand which phishing attack strate-
gies work better in practice and why. The paper provided the first empirical
evidence on which malicious strategies are successful at deceiving general users
by conducting experiments with 22 users.
Recently, Sunshine et al. [53] presented an empirical study of SSL warning
effectiveness, which showed that users do not behave as expected and that they
often exhibit dangerous behavior. Based on the lessons that they were able to
learn, the authors conducted experiments with 100 users and designed new warn-
ings that performed significantly better than the SSL certificate warnings used in
browsers today.
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Besides Dhamija et al.’s and Sunshine et al.’s previous studies that solely
focused on phishing and SSL certificate warnings, there have not been any com-
prehensive studies on how users are able to cope with current threats and popular
attacks on the Internet, and how they behave and make decisions in an adversar-
ial setting. This work presents the first empirical findings that shed light on how
different user groups deal with, and react to, common Internet attacks such as
cross-site scripting, session fixation, malware infections, and file sharing scams.
Our findings show that although many users suspect and may be able to detect
a potential attack, they make wrong decisions with respect to their security as
they are not aware of the consequences of their actions. Also, our experiments
demonstrate that users often have a completely wrong understanding of security
risks, and what may constitute an attack.
Our findings empirically confirm the general intuition that security education
has a significant effect in practice in preventing the more complex Internet at-
tacks, and that a general “security awareness” is critical for user protection. We
believe that online test systems such as the one we have constructed are useful
in educating students and users about popular attacks on the Internet.
This work makes the following contributions:
• We present an online security test system that presents 50 typical benign
and malicious use cases to users, and records their behavior. We have
conducted empirical experiments with a diverse set of more than 160 users.
To the best of our knowledge, the study we present is the largest that
has been conducted to date on current Internet threats such as cross-site
scripting and file sharing scams.
• We show that, while exposure to common attacks such as email scams
helps users get familiar with and avert similar threats in future encounters,
more advanced attacks (e.g., session fixation) are still only detected through
security training. We also show that users with a security education are
better at assessing the consequences of a possible threat and making the
right decisions.
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• We provide empirical evidence that many users treat “length” and “size”
as a sign of maliciousness (e.g., length of URLs and size of files).
• We show that clear, direct and intimidating security warnings are more
effective in conveying risk to users compared to detailed technical explana-
tions.
• We show that trick banners that are common in file sharing websites have a
high success rate of deceiving technically unsophisticated users, and there-
fore, pose an important security threat.
• We provide empirical evidence that non-technical users are frequently
tricked by shortened URLs, and are largely not aware of simple web-security
tools and services such as shortened URL expanders.
• We show that technically insufficient users are mostly deceived by man-
in-the-middle attacks during online transactions and although second au-
thentication channels help technically inclined people to avoid the attack,
non-technical users fail to benefit from them.
The rest of this thesis study is structured as follows: In Chapter 2 we provide
a brief overview of common Internet attacks. In Chapter 3, we summarize the
related work. In Chapter 4, we present our experiment platform and give details
of each test we performed on the participants. In Chapter 5, we show the results
we obtained from the tests and list our observations. In Chapter 6, we discuss
these results, and summarize the insights we distilled. Finally, in Chapter 7, we
briefly conclude the thesis.
Chapter 2
Common Internet Attacks
In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the common Internet attacks and
explain some related terms.
• Phishing can be explained as directing users to fraudulent web sites [26]. It
is generally used in conjunction with link manipulation techniques.
• Link manipulation is the effort of making a link’s destination look different
from it really is. It can be achieved in many ways. One of the most com-
monly utilized methods is taking advantage of the Domain Name System
hierarchy. http://www.paypal.hostding.com can be given as an example
to this method. In fact, it points to the paypal subdomain of the hostd-
ing domain. However, it can easily be mistaken as a legitimate link to a
page in the Paypal domain by unknowledgeable or careless users. Another
widely used method is putting a reliable destination to the displayed text of
a link, while the link points to another, potentially dangerous destination.
Although most browsers display the real destination when a user hovers his
mouse on the link, users usually don’t check it. There are also other link
manipulation techniques like internationalized domain name homographic
attack or using links containing the ’@’ symbol.
• Cross site scripting (XSS) is injecting client side scripts (e.g., JavaScript)
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into interactive web pages as an input. In the most common reflected type,
which we used in our tests, the script is embedded into a link and when the
user clicks it, the vulnerable target website executes the script.
• Session fixation is fixing a user’s session ID before the user even logs into
the target server [40]. In order to achieve this, the attacker should create a
link with a valid session identifier and convice the user to click on the link
including the fixed session identifier.
• URL shortening is using an HTTP redirect on a short domain name to a
long URL. It can be used to hide the underlying URL, thus sometimes it is
used for malicious purposes.
• IP address links are links that contain an IP address instead of a domain
name. Just like shortened URLs, IP address links can be used for malicious
purposes.
• Advance fee fraud is a fraud that attempts to trick prospective victims into
parting with funds by persuading them that they will receive a substantial
benefit in return for providing some modest payment in advance [50]. The
most famous example knows as the Nigerian scam or 419 scam, which we
used in our tests, involves a person who is “allegedly” looking for someone
to help him move some funds abroad by providing a bank account, in return
for a generous comission. If the victim takes the bait, the attacker will ask
for some advance payment to deal with a complication, and thus the victim
is scammed [28].
• Scareware is a software which scares users into taking action by using fake
threat warnings. The action can be something like buying a useless soft-
ware or visiting a malicious website in order to get rid of the bogus threat.
Sometimes, scareware can be in the form of web pop-up windows.
• Trick banner is a banner ad that tries to trick people into clicking it. In
the case of file sharing websites, trick banners try to disguise themselves as
legitimate download links.
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• Man-in-the-middle attack (a.k.a. bucket brigade attack) is an attack where
the attacker compromises the connection between two parties and then
impersonates the other party to both parties. While the two parties believe
that they are communicating with each other, in fact the communication is
totally controlled by the man in the middle.
• Man-in-the-browser attack is a type of man-in-the-middle attack, where
the man-in-the-middle is a browser trojan. In this attack, the trojan can
change the details of an online transaction (e.g., the target account of a
money transfer) without the user’s knowledge.
• Two-factor authentication is an authentication method that requires two
independent pieces of information (i.e., factors) to establish identity and
privileges [51]. If these factors are transported over two different channels,
it can also be named as two-channel authentication, and the supporting
channel can be referred to as the second authentication channel.
Chapter 3
Related Work
Although attacks such as cross-site scripting, session fixation and social
engineering-based malware are common on the Internet, there has not been any
comprehensive empirical study to determine the awareness level of Internet users
about these attack vectors, and how they are able to deal with such attacks in
practice.
As mentioned before, one well-known work that attempts to understand why
phishing strategies work was conducted by Dhamija et al. [26]. In another re-
lated effort, Sunshine et al. [53] presented an empirical study of SSL warning
effectiveness. Note that both studies focused on very specific aspects of secu-
rity (i.e., phishing and SSL warnings, respectively) while our study has a much
broader scope, covering general web attacks (e.g., reflected cross-site scripting),
file sharing and e-mail scams (e.g., fake search results and attached malicious
files), general security warnings (e.g., antivirus messages), and attacks against
financially sensitive operations (i.e., man-in-the-middle attacks targeting online
banking websites).
Friedman et al. [31] conducted a number of general interviews about web secu-
rity and concluded that many participants could not reliably determine whether
a connection is secure. The participants were shown screenshots of a browser con-
necting to a site and they had to decide if the connection was secure or not. In
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another study [32], Friedman et al. interviewed participants about their concerns
on risks and potential harms of web use. In comparison, our work focuses on
concrete technical web attacks such as session fixation, cross-site scripting, and
malicious links provided by URL shortening services. We report our findings on
how users behave when confronted with such realistic attacks.
A recent work by Conti et al. [25] suggests a taxonomy of malicious interface
techniques. The authors conducted a survey on a group of users to measure their
frustration and tolerance when they encounter such interfaces. However, this
study does not discuss the effectiveness of such techniques at deceiving users.
Other researchers have attempted to measure the effectiveness of social en-
gineering attacks in social networks. For example, in [38], Jagatic et al. have
performed realistic phishing attacks on undergraduate students based on the in-
formation they were able to harvest from social networking websites. In another
work, Bilge et al. [20] were able to show that users tend to have a higher level of
trust in messages they receive from their social networks.
Finally, there exist several studies on the usability of security solutions. For
example, in [22], Chiasson et al. describe a usability study they have conducted
on 26 users which shows that some previously proposed security solutions have
serious usability problems. In [23], Clark et al. present another study on the
usability of anonymous web browsing. Note that compared to general existing
work on the usability of security solutions, our main focus in this paper is on
determining and understanding how users react to common attacks.
Chapter 4
Design of the Experiments
In this chapter, we describe the setup we developed to test and simulate the
typical security threats that users may encounter in their everyday Internet usage.
In order to be able to reach a large number of users with diverse backgrounds,
we conducted online experiments using an interactive test platform.
We designed the experiments as a within-group study in which all participants
responded to a series of tests in various security contexts. After studying a wide
range of common Internet attacks that require some sort of user interaction or
decision (e.g., reflected cross-site scripting attacks, advertisement trick banners,
scareware pop-ups, etc.), we created 50 security-related scenarios, grouped in five
test suites: web-based attacks, email-based attacks, file sharing-related attacks,
application security warnings and online banking (See Figure 4.1).
After reaching the homepage of our online test platform (See Figure 4.2), we
informed the participants that they were going to take part in “an experiment to
determine the security-awareness of Internet users” and asked them to provide
an email address. We also informed the participants that the tests would take
about an hour. Moreover, at the beginning of each test, we provided them with
the estimated time to complete it and a short explanation on what they should
do (See Figure 4.3).
10
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Figure 4.1: List of test suites
In order to mitigate the negative effects of motivational confounds and prevent
inaccurate results due to loss of concentration, we gave participants the option
to leave after completing any number of tests, and come back again later to
continue from where they left off. Apart from their email addresses (which we
used to uniquely identify participants in case they wanted to continue the tests
later), we did not ask for any other personally identifiable information.
We recruited the participants through announcements on Twitter and Face-
book, and by directly asking people in other disciplines (e.g., medicine, geology)
to promote our test platform URL. After eliminating the data from 2 respon-
dents due to their poor command of English, we completed our empirical study
with 164 participants. However, the file sharing test suite was available only to
the participants that reported previous experience with BitTorrent or with one-
click-hosting services (91 and 97 participants, respectively). In addition, online
banking test suite was optional and was completed by 140 participants. In the
following sections, we describe in more detail the security tests we conducted.
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Figure 4.2: Home page of our online test platform
4.1 Demographic Information
Before starting the tests, we collected standard demographic information. In ad-
dition, since we were interested in observing the effects of technical background on
the results of the experiments, we asked the participants several questions to esti-
mate their security proficiency. More specifically, we asked them if they are com-
fortable with doing everyday tasks using their computers, if they have previous
programming experience, if they are professionally involved in software/hardware
development, if they have a degree in computer science or a related technical field,
Figure 4.3: Short briefing screen at the beginning of a test
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Figure 4.4: Facebook wall post with a reflected cross-site scripting attack
and if they have specialized security expertise.
4.2 Web-Based Attacks
The first test suite presented the participants with various URLs, and asked them
to rate the “risk they perceived” for each link. That is, the participants were asked
to rate how dangerous or safe they believed it would be to click on the links. The
risk perception ratings were given in the 5-point Likert scale [43], ranging from
“Definitely safe” to “I cannot decide”, to “Definitely dangerous”. After assessing
the risk for the link, the participants were also asked if they would click on the
link and were prompted to briefly explain the rationale behind their decision.
The test suite included both malicious and benign URLs. Malicious URLs
exemplified common attacks such as cross-site scripting, session fixation and link
manipulation tricks (see Figure 4.4 for an example). The rest of the tests included
perfectly benign but somewhat unconventional links with, for instance, a very long
parameter list, a non-HTTP protocol, and mixed-case characters.
Each URL and its related questions were presented on a separate page. The
URLs were created using actual HTML anchor tags to allow the browsers to
render them authentically, and to allow the participants to hover their mouse
over the links to see the hyperlink destination in the browser’s status bar.
For two URLs (one given as a raw IP address and the other one as a
TinyURL [14] link), the participants were also given a third option: to verify
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Figure 4.5: Spam email with a generic text and a suspicious link
the destination and then decide if they would follow the link. The participants
who chose this option were asked to briefly explain how they would determine
the destination.
Clicking on links was disabled for all tests by including an appropriate
Javascript code. Note that there were two exceptions where we included a screen-
shot instead of embedding the link in the HTML page. These were attacks that
required a context surrounding the link (e.g., the Facebook wall post shown in
Figure 4.4).
4.3 Email-Based Attacks
In the email-based attacks test suite, we showed the participants screenshots
of emails together with full header information. The suite included a PayPal
phishing email, a spam email suggesting to click on an IP link, an ordinary
eBay newsletter, a fake prize-giveaway notification, a malicious email with an
executable attachment, an advance-fee fraud with the classic Nigerian connec-
tion text (e.g., [56]), an innocuous Amazon advertisement, and a phishing email
crafted to look like it is sent from a bank (see Figure 4.5 for an example). Simi-
lar to the web-based attacks test suite, we asked the participants to rate the risk
they perceived on a 5-point Likert scale. We also asked the participants whether
they would react to the email by, for example, downloading the attachment, and
asked them to state the reasons behind their decisions.
Again, each email and the related questions were shown on a separate page.
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Prior to every question, the participants were informed that they should ignore
the email headers, and only focus on the email content, if they did not know how
to interpret the header information.
4.4 File Sharing-Related Attacks
In the file sharing test suite, our aim was to confront the participants with typical
(but potentially risky) file sharing scenarios (e.g., the download of an executable
file disguised as a movie). Clearly, making the participants go through a number
of file sharing scenarios if they did not possess prior experience in the area would
not have produced useful results. Therefore, prior to the file sharing tests, we
asked the participants whether they know what BitTorrent or One-click-hosting
are, and whether they had experience with the websites we used in our tests.
The participants who responded negatively were directly taken to the next suite,
skipping the rest of the tests.
We split the file sharing test suite in two parts: BitTorrent-related tests and
One-click-hosting-related tests. In the BitTorrent tests, we walked the partici-
pants through a scenario in which they were trying to download their favorite
movie. We showed the participants a set of screenshots of torrent search results
and torrent detail listings, as presented by three popular BitTorrent hosters/meta-
search engines: The Pirate Bay [12], isoHunt [7] and Torrentz [15]. Each of these
included cues to the legitimacy (or the lack thereof) of the movie file such as file
extensions, file sizes, torrent contents, number of people sharing the file, reputa-
tion of the uploader, torrent descriptions, and warnings in user comments (see
Figure 4.6 for an example).
We then asked the participants to rate the risk they perceived for each search
result we presented them, and decide whether they would proceed to download
the file. Furthermore, we asked the participants which cues they used when they
made a decision. While the screenshots showing the details of a single torrent
were presented on a separate page, the search results were all given in the same
CHAPTER 4. DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENTS 16
Figure 4.6: Search results for a movie in Filestube with a bad file extension and
a suspicious size.
page in order for the participants to be able to compare the search hits to each
other.
Once the questions were answered, we took the participants to fully interactive
torrent download pages carefully reproduced from the ones of The Pirate Bay and
isoHunt. We then asked them to click on the correct download button among the
various advertisement banners disguising themselves as legitimate download links.
Note that we did not introduce any artificial web banners for the purpose of our
study. Instead, we faithfully copied the original content from the corresponding
websites for more realistic observations.
We designed the One-click-hosting tests in a similar fashion. However, this
time, we showed screenshots and reproduced pages from the popular websites
Filestube [4], iFolder [6], Megaupload [10] and Megavideo [11].
4.5 General Security Warnings
In the general security warnings test suite, we showed the participants screenshots
of different types of security warning windows: an invalid SSL certificate warning
when trying to open Facebook, a blacklisted website warning in Firefox, a virus
alert by an antivirus scanner, and a scareware virus alert web pop-up.
Since there is no definite answer to the legitimacy of some of these warnings,
we only asked the participants whether they believe the warning is critical, and
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to explain the rationale behind their decision. As always, each screenshot was
presented on a separate page.
4.6 Online Banking
In the final test suite, we asked participants to transfer money to given account
numbers using a simple website we built for this purpose (see Figure 4.7). After
completing the transactions, we asked them to answer some questions about
them. Moreover, we tried two-factor authentication with 50 of the participants
by sending them one-time codes by SMS to authenticate their transactions (see
Figure 4.8).
The task in this test suit was to perform two transactions, the first of which
was a regular transaction. However in the second transaction, we altered the
destination account number, simulating the behavior of some man-in-the-browser
trojans [21]. This alteration could be seen by the participants in the transaction
summary screen and in the SMSes they received.
4.7 Processing of the Results
We used R Programming Language [13] to make statistical computations and to
produce the necessary graphs. However, we first needed to process the raw data
we gathered from the users through some intermediate steps to make them into
proper R input.
We started by producing keys for test suites. These keys were mainly used
for quantifying the replies to questions with definite answers, which were in turn
used to calculate security and risk perception scores. On the other hand, ques-
tions without definite answers (demographic questions, open-ended questions,
etc.) were simply copied to output files. We used a Python script to produce
output files by interpreting input and key files.
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Figure 4.7: Online banking website
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Figure 4.8: SMS including a one-time code to authenticate an online banking
transaction
After that, we manually categorized the answers to open-ended questions and
tagged them. We determined the following categories:
• technical : Means that the participant used a technical point of view in his
answer (e.g., he investigated the header of an email).
• wrong technical : Means the participant approached the situation from a
mistaken technical point (e.g., he doesn’t realize the actual destination of a
link is different from the one in its anchor text and technically examines the
anchor text). We should emphasize that wrong refers to the method rather
than the result. Taking the right action for the wrong technical reasons still
falls under this category.
• familiarity : Signifies that the participant relies on his past experience while
answering.
• content/context/source: Denotes that the participant depends on the con-
tent of the item in question (e.g., he says he never reads emails in “need
your help” format), the context in which it appears (e.g., he says he doesn’t
follow links in emails), or its source (e.g., he says he would base his judge-
ment on the reliability of the website which provides the link) while giving
his answer.
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Name of the test Goal Type of data
Kruskal-Wallis one
way ANOVA
Compare three or more
unmatched groups
Rank, score or measure-
ment from non-Gaussian
population
Spearman’s rank cor-
relation
Quantify association
between two variables
Rank, score or measure-
ment from non-Gaussian
population
Pearson’s product-
moment correlation
Quantify association
between two variables
Measurement from
Gaussian population
Fisher’s exact test Compare two unpaired
groups
Binomial (two possible
outcomes)
Wilcoxon rank-sum
test (a.k.a Mann-
Whitney U test)
Compare two unpaired
groups
Rank, score or measure-
ment from non-Gaussian
population
Pearson’s chi-squared
test
Compare three or more
unmatched groups
Binomial (two possible
outcomes)
Table 4.1: Applicability criteria for each of the statistical tests we used
• intuition/guess/clueless : Means the participant has no idea about the sit-
uation, or he feels like it is dangerous/safe but cannot show a reason as to
why.
Then, we used a small Java program that produces csv files from these in-
termediate files. While doing so, it also removes answers to the open-ended
questions, leaving only their tags. Finally, these csv files were used by R to pro-
duce statistical results. Table 4.1 shows the applicability criteria for each of the
statistical tests we used [5].
Chapter 5
Analysis of the Test Results
In this chapter, we explain the strategy we used to evaluate the collected data,
and we present the results obtained through the experiments. In Chapter 6, we
interpret these results, and summarize the insights we distilled.
5.1 Demographics and Diversity
The test participants were 31.1% female and 68.9% male, their ages ranged
from 19 to 69 (mean=26.52, s.d.=8.76, variance=76.79), and their nationalities
spanned 17 different countries.
11.6% of the participants held a doctoral degree, 10.4% a master’s degree,
45.8% a bachelor’s degree, and 1.2% an associate’s degree. 72.6% of our partic-
ipants were continuing students of which 5.5% were pursuing a doctoral degree,
37.2% a master’s degree, and 29.9% a bachelor’s degree. 33.5% of them were
professionally employed.
The majority of the participants reported being familiar and comfortable with
common tasks and concepts such as surfing the web and using email services, so-
cial network applications, entertainment activities like watching movies and play-
ing games, performing e-commerce and e-banking operations, installing and using
21
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Figure 5.1: Five-number summaries of participant familiarity with typical com-
puter tasks and concepts. Mean values are also displayed by the black dots.
applications, and doing basic system maintenance by configuring their operating
system and recovering from simple errors (see Figure 5.1 for the corresponding
five-number summaries).
65.6% of the test participants used Windows as their primary operating sys-
tem, 17.7% used Linux, 15.6% used Mac OS X, and one participant used a BSD-
variant. 41.5% of them preferred Firefox, 34.8% preferred Chrome, 14.6% pre-
ferred Internet Explorer, 6.1% preferred Safari, and the remaining 3.0% used
various other web browsers.
Based on the participants’ responses to the questions about their security
background, we divided them into three expertise groups:
• Non-techies use computers at home or work on a regular basis. They are
comfortable using basic applications to perform everyday tasks. Their pro-
fessions are in non-technical fields, and they have little, or no programming
experience. 42.7% of the test participants fall into this group.
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Security Scores
Min 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max
Web Tests
Non-techies 22.2 44.4 55.6 56.7 66.7 100.0
Techies 44.4 55.6 66.7 68.0 77.8 100.0
Experts 33.3 66.7 77.8 74.2 88.9 100.0
Email Tests
Non-techies 50.0 75.0 75.0 77.5 87.5 100.0
Techies 62.5 75.0 87.5 85.2 100.0 100.0
Experts 50.0 75.0 87.5 84.7 100.0 100.0
BitTorrent Tests
Non-techies 36.4 54.5 54.5 58.7 63.6 90.9
Techies 36.4 45.4 63.6 63.6 75.0 90.9
Experts 36.4 54.5 63.6 63.6 72.7 81.8
One-click Hosting Tests
Non-techies 20.0 60.0 60.0 64.8 80.0 100.0
Techies 40.0 65.0 80.0 79.1 100.0 100.0
Experts 40.0 60.0 80.0 76.1 100.0 100.0
Risk Perception Scores
Min. 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max
Web Tests
Non-techies 46.7 60.0 63.3 64.1 68.9 82.2
Techies 53.3 64.4 71.1 71.1 75.6 91.1
Experts 53.3 68.9 75.6 74.3 79.4 91.1
Email Tests
Non-techies 40.0 65.0 72.5 71.7 80.0 97.5
Techies 55.0 75.0 80.0 80.8 87.5 97.5
Experts 60.0 75.6 81.2 81.4 90.0 92.5
BitTorrent Tests
Non-techies 49.1 56.4 60.9 60.9 63.6 76.4
Techies 56.4 61.8 66.4 65.8 67.7 78.2
Experts 54.5 61.8 67.3 66.4 70.9 80.0
One-click Hosting Tests
Non-techies 48.0 60.0 68.0 67.6 72.0 100.0
Techies 48.0 69.0 76.0 74.5 84.0 92.0
Experts 56.0 68.0 72.0 73.1 80.0 92.0
Table 5.1: Five-number summaries for each test suite and participant group.
Mean scores are also given for comparison to the median.
• Techies are either computer scientists, or otherwise involved in a closely-
related field of study or profession (such as engineering disciplines dealing
with technology). These participants are knowledgeable on the intricacies
of computer systems. However, their technical training does not focus on
computer security. Techies constitute 19.5% of the participants.
• Experts are computer security professionals. In their studies or professions,
they specialize in securing computer systems. They claim to have a deep
understanding of security fundamentals, and have some practical experience
in the field. 37.8% of the participants are experts.
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5.2 Security and Risk Perception
In order to quantify the performance of the participants in the security tests, we
computed two global scores: a security score and a risk perception score.
The security score is a measure of how good a participant is at averting
attacks, while also refraining from erroneously discrediting non-threats as being
dangerous. We compute the security score as the total number of questions
answered correctly in this manner. We then normalize it to account for the
participants who skipped any of the file sharing tests, and scale it to a value
between 0 and 100.
The risk perception score is a measure of a participant’s ability to recognize
the severity and consequences of each situation. We compute it based on the
5-point Likert [43] scale, with questions that ask the participants how dangerous
they think each scenario is. For an obvious threat, the participants who respond
with ’definitely dangerous’ receive 5 points, while those who answer ’definitely
safe’ only receive 1 point. For benign items, we reverse the scores accordingly.
We then normalize and scale the score in the same way we calculate the security
score.
Considering all the participants in all tests, the security scores ranged from
46.43 to 96.97 (mean=70.21, s.d.=10.84, variance=117.53, 1st quartile=63.64,
median=69.70, 3rd quartile=78.57) and risk perception scores ranged from
48.18 to 90.59 (mean=70.48, s.d.=7.35, variance=54.09, 1st quartile=66.29, me-
dian=70.45, 3rd quartile=75.19). The distributions of scores for the three groups
are summarized in the violin plots in Figure 5.2. Note that, since scores show
what percentage of the questions were answered correctly, values close to the
middle of the scale (i.e., 50) could possibly indicate no security awareness but
merely random guesses.
Out of all the questions the participants answered incorrectly, 56.1% were
benign samples misjudged as being malicious. 43.9% were attacks confused as
being benign. This slight imbalance could be explained by the observation that
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Figure 5.2: Five-number summaries and probability densities of total scores
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participants were probably over-careful because they were expecting to encounter
attacks in the tests.
The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance tests [41] showed that both
the security and risk perception scores differed significantly among the three par-
ticipant groups (i.e., H = 26.89, df = 2, p = 1.45 × 10−6 for security scores
and H = 37.36, df = 2, p = 7.71 × 10−9 for risk perception scores). Follow-
ing these with multiple comparison post-hoc tests revealed that non-techies and
experts differed significantly in both scores, while non-techies and techies, or
techies and experts did not. This means that both security and risk perception
considerably increased with security expertise.
We also analyzed the scores for each test suite separately (see Table 5.1), and
checked the scores once again for potential differences among participant groups.
Similarly, the risk perception scores differed significantly between non-techies
and experts in every test suite. However, we observed that the security scores
only differed significantly for the web-based attacks suite between non-techies
and experts (i.e., H = 25.42, df = 2, p = 3.01 × 10−6). We did not observe a
statistically significant difference in security scores for the email and the two file
sharing test suites (i.e., p > 0.54, p > 0.23 and p > 0.67, respectively).
When we investigated the relationship between risk perception and security
scores in each participant group (see Figure 5.3), an analysis with Spearman’s
rank correlation [52] revealed that the two types of scores are positively correlated
for each group. In other words, for higher risk perception scores, the security
scores show an increasing trend as well. However, this correlation is considerably
weaker for non-techies (i.e., ρ = 0.50, p = 9.99 × 10−6) compared to techies and
experts combined (i.e., ρ = 0.70, p = 6.51× 10−15).
Moreover, we looked into the relationship between the familiarity with secu-
rity terms and security and risk perception scores. In order to achieve this, we
calculated a security terms familiarity score for each participant by asking them
to rank their familiarity with the following security terms in a scale of 1 to 5
(5: very familiar, 1: not familiar at all): malware, virus, trojan, worm, spyware,
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Figure 5.3: Relationship between risk perception and security scores
adware, scareware, botnet, spam, phishing, drive-by-download, SSL/TLS, cer-
tificate, https and social engineering. Then, we summed the answers for each
participant and scaled the result to make it into a score out of 100. After analyz-
ing the aforementioned relationship using Spearman’s rank correlation, we found
a correlation between the familiarity score and security and risk perception scores
(ρ = 0.38, p = 4.44×10−7 for security scores and ρ = 0.70, p < 2.2×10−16 for risk
perception scores). This means people who are more familiar with terms related
to the internet attacks are more successful at both recognizing and averting them.
Finally, in our study group, we did not see a statistically significant correlation
between the age and education level of the participants and either of the scores
(p > 0.50, p > 0.23 for security scores and p > 0.72, p > 0.52 for risk perception
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Blindly Follow Ignore Technically Verify Depends on Source Not Familiar
TinyURL
Non-tech 17.1 % 74.3 % 0.0 % 8.6 % 35.7 %
Tech 21.9 % 31.3 % 18.7 % 28.1 % 15.6 %
Expert 16.1 % 32.3 % 32.3 % 19.3 % 4.8 %
Raw IP
Non-tech 15.7 % 80.0 % 0.0 % 4.3 % 28.6 %
Tech 18.8 % 43.7 % 25.0 % 12.5 % 6.3 %
Expert 17.7 % 38.7 % 33.9 % 9.7 % 3.2 %
Table 5.2: Results showing participants’ decisions when confronted with a short-
ened URL and a raw IP link. The “Not familiar” column is not mutually exclusive
with the others, i.e., some participants stated they do not know what a shortened
URL is but decided to follow it anyway.
scores, respectively). The score medians differed significantly with sex, where
females scored significantly lower compared to males. However, this was largely
due to the females being concentrated in the non-techies. When testing for each
group separately there was no significant difference in score medians within groups
(i.e., p > 0.43, p > 0.70, p > 0.49 for security scores and p > 0.38, p > 0.49,
p > 0.32 for risk perception scores, for each group, respectively).
5.3 Test-Specific Results
The test suites contained questions that cannot be effectively quantified with the
previous scoring approach. Hence, we used case-specific evaluation strategies for
these questions, as described in the following subsections.
5.3.1 Web Tests Including IP Addresses and Shortened
URLs
In the web-based attacks suite, the legitimacy of the IP and shortened URL links
(e.g., TinyURL) cannot be determined just by looking at the URL. Hence, we
did not compute scores for them. Instead, we investigated how many participants
were able to successfully verify the link destinations. For example, the partic-
ipants could have fetched HTML headers, performed WHOIS and reverse DNS
look-ups, or utilized URL expansion tools. A summary of these results is given
CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF THE TEST RESULTS 29
Pira
teB
ay
isoH
unt
File
stub
e
Meg
aup
load iFol
der
Meg
avid
eo
Non−techies
Techies
Experts
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f c
or
re
ct
 c
lic
ks
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Figure 5.4: Correct clicks for the trick banner tests on pages reproduced from
popular file sharing websites
in Table 5.2.
The most striking observation in the experiments was that none of the par-
ticipants in the non-techie group said that they would attempt to verify the
destination of either the IP, or the TinyURL link. Moreover, compared to the
other groups, a considerably higher number of non-techies did not know what an
IP address, or URL shortening was.
Note that many participants directly related to their previous surfing expe-
rience and were confused by similar links they had used in the past. In their
answers, these participants demonstrated a completely wrong technical under-
standing of the use of IP addresses, or URL shortening services. For example,
some answers we received indicated an IP to be an interface for a printer/router
configuration screen, an index of photographs, and “proxy code”. The TinyURL
link was thought to be a YouTube video, a photo sharing service, a blog, and an
MP3 download website.
CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF THE TEST RESULTS 30
5.3.2 Trick Banner Tests
For the simulated websites in the file sharing test suite, we counted the number
of clicks on the correct download links, as well as on deceptive banners crafted
with the aim of luring Internet users to click on them. The percentage of clicks
on the correct links for all participant groups are shown in Figure 5.4. The high
error rate in the iFolder test was in part because we reproduced the page in its
original language (Russian). The aim was to observe the participants’ navigation
behavior when the website is in an unfamiliar language.
These results showed that while most experts and techies were able to rec-
ognize and avoid false banners, the majority of non-techies failed. That is, such
participants did not realize that they were not clicking on the actual link (and
were being tricked into clicking on potentially dangerous banners) even though
they reported being familiar with the test website.
5.3.3 General Security Warning Tests
For the general security warning suite, we collected and analyzed the qualitative
feedback we received from the participants after displaying them a number of
specific warning screens, and asking them how they would react to them.
The first security warning in this suite, an SSL certificate error raised when
visiting the Facebook homepage, generated mixed opinions, balanced by opposing
views among the different participants groups. 46 participants told us that they
would ignore the warning since they regularly encounter similar situations every
day. In contrast, 37 participants said that they would trust their browser’s warn-
ing, and immediately leave the website. 22 participants thought that it would be
safe to ignore the warning since Facebook is very well-known while 17 participants
believed that its popularity would make Facebook an obvious target for attacks,
making it difficult to ignore such a warning. 11 participants said that they would
have ignored the warning if they had visited the website in question before, and
had not seen a warning message. In comparison, 10 participants responded in the
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exact opposite way; they stated that they would know an attack is taking place
if the website did not raise a warning in previous visits. Interestingly, among the
techie and expert participants, only 9 participants could correctly recognize the
possible threat scenario (such as a DNS-based attack). The rest provided wrong
reasons for the displayed warning. For example, 7 participants thought that the
fault would most likely be in their machines.
In the next part of the test suite, where we displayed a screenshot of a black-
listed website warning in Firefox, the majority of the participants (i.e., 121) agreed
that taking the warning seriously would be the best course of action and only 2
participants claimed that they had encountered false alarms in the past. From
the participants’ comments we can conclude that the text of the warning (i.e.,
Reported Attack Page!) was very important in recognizing and evaluating the
danger. For example, many reported that it was frightening, and some non-techie
participants explicitly stated that “The red color is scary” or that “This error
seems more serious [than the certificate error].”.
We obtained similar results for the malware scanner screenshot that warns
the participants of a possible infection. 122 participants said they would comply
with their antivirus software’s recommendation, and delete the infected files. The
common rationale is perfectly summarized by one of the comments: “Isn’t this
why I pay for the antivirus software? If I don’t trust it, why do I pay for it?”.
However, 20 participants said they would ignore the warning if they recognized
the reported files as being “benign”.
The final warning screen simulated a scareware web pop-up (i.e., a browser
pop-up window that imitates an alert from a virus scanner tool) with an exagger-
ated list of reported infected files. This test tricked 81 participants into believing
that it was an authentic malware alarm. A participant who claimed to be a se-
curity expert stated his concern: “With so many files infected, I would re-install
the system”. Non-techies in particular were confused by the number of reported
infections. One of them stated that he would definitely click on the web pop-up,
and added: “Easy decision with that many infections!”. Only 23 participants (of
which only one was a non-techie) demonstrated familiarity with scareware, while
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Without second channel With second channel
Noticed attack Didn’t notice attack Noticed attack Didn’t notice attack
Non-techies 6.5 % 93.5 % 0 % 100 %
Techies 5.6 % 94.4 % 45.5 % 54.5 %
Experts 7.7 % 92.3 % 36 % 64 %
Table 5.3: Results showing percentage of participants who realized and who didn’t
realize the man-in-the-middle attack, based on their expertise groups and the
utilization of second authentication channel.
58 participants in all groups averted the threat either because they thought web
pop-up warnings were not convincing, or because they knew websites cannot scan
their computers without their authorization.
5.3.4 Online Banking Tests
For the online banking suite, we investigated how many participants noticed the
change in the account number during the second transaction. In order to improve
participants’ chance of noticing the change, we presented the destination account
number they should use as an image file instead of a text. This forced them
to manually enter the account number, which makes it easier to recognize the
alteration afterwards. A summary of the results is given in Table 5.3.
An interesting observation was that none of the non-techies who used the
second authentication channel (i.e., SMS) realized an attack was going on, even
though some who didn’t use the second channel realized the situation. On the
other hand, utilization of the second authentication channel proved to be useful
on techies and experts. An analysis with Fisher’s exact test [30] demonstrates
that the usage of the SMS codes helped the participants to perform significantly
better (i.e., p = 9.04× 10−4).
We also investigated the relationship between successfully realizing the attack
and the frequency of online banking (How often do you use online banking?)
and the frequency of transferring money using online banking (How often do
you make money transfers using online banking?). A Wilcoxon rank-sum test
(a.k.a. Mann-Whitney U test) [45] shows that while the relationship between
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realizing the attack and frequently performing online banking operations isn’t
strong enough to be considered significant, frequently transferring money using
online banking significantly improves the performance of the participants ( p = 0.6
and p = 0.3, respectively).
Lastly, we looked into the relationship between a user’s expertise group and his
success in the online banking test. Pearson’s Chi-squared test [46] showed that the
success rate differed significantly among three groups (i.e., X − squared = 7.41,
df = 2, p = 0.02). Following this with Fisher’s exact tests between pairs of
groups revealed that non-techies and experts differed significantly, while non-
techies and techies, or techies and experts did not ( p = 0.011, p = 0.053 and
p = 1, respectively). This means that success rate of noticing the attack increased
with security expertise.
Chapter 6
Discussion and Insights Gained
In this chapter, we provide detailed interpretations of the test results presented
in Chapter 5, and list the insights we distilled from them.
6.1 Security Training and Risk Perception
As we have shown in Section 5.2, when the overall scores are considered, techies
and experts performed significantly better than non-techie participants. In the
individual test suites, as one would intuitively expect, the techies and experts
also received higher scores. However, we only observed a statistically significant
difference between these groups in the web security test suite. In other words, we
did not see statistical proof that, when generalized to the whole population, the
security experts would perform better in email and file sharing security scenarios
compared to technically unsophisticated users. For example, our results confirm
that even an average Internet user has sufficient experience to detect and mitigate
common attacks that they regularly encounter (e.g., an email promoting the
Nigerian scam).
Note that, the fact that users are able to detect an attack does not neces-
sarily mean they also understand its intricacies, or its consequences. In fact, for
34
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the email test suite, when we categorized the decision making strategies of the
participants by looking at their explanations, only 2.9% of the responses given
by non-techies provided meaningful technical insights, while the remaining 97.1%
were based purely on intuition and past experience. In contrast, 23.4% of the
techies and 30.6% of the experts directly looked for technical cues while detect-
ing an attack (e.g., by investigating the email headers).
Our results empirically demonstrate that after continuous exposure to spam
emails and common scams such as fake prize-giveaways, most of the non-techie
users learn to instinctively avoid these attacks. This observation is in line with
psychology literature that shows individuals fall back on their intuition when
faced with complex information that they cannot process. That is, the guesses
based on intuition could be correct since they draw from vast previous experi-
ence [27, 36].
The attacks we presented to the participants in the web security test suite
(e.g., link manipulation and code injection tricks) were more sophisticated com-
pared to classic email scam scenarios. Hence, detecting these attacks required
specialized technical knowledge. Although the participants who were security ex-
perts always scored higher than non-techies, the web attack test suite was where
their security training gave them a substantial advantage over technically unso-
phisticated users. The web security scores show that the majority of technically
unsophisticated users are not equipped to deal with more elaborate attack scenar-
ios. In fact, intuition and “folk wisdom” without any technical basis sometimes
even misled non-techie participants: for example, exactly half of these users be-
lieved that a partially upper-case URL like www.googLE.com was a clever attempt
at phishing.
The results we presented in Section 5.2 indicate that the difference in risk
perception scores between non-technical participants and experts is statistically
significant. Note that this observation holds even in the tests where the security
scores do not significantly differ among these two groups. That is, non-techies and
experts have different perceptions of the risk in a given situation (i.e., the risk
perception scores differ significantly). Nevertheless, these groups reach similar
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conclusions, and act in a similar manner (i.e., the security scores do not differ
significantly).
Although non-technical participants can sometimes detect attacks, this does
not imply that they realize the severity of a threat. In the tests where the security
scores of the non-techies are closer to those of the experts, these technically
unsophisticated participants do not really “perceive” the danger of the situation.
Rather, they depend on their intuition and past experience. In most of the cases,
the non-technical participants judged a malicious email (e.g., a Paypal phishing
scam) as being “Definitely safe”, or being “Most Probably Safe”, stating that
they cannot read email headers, and that they do not see anything wrong with
the content. However, they chose to ignore the mail instead of clicking on the
given link. One participant explained: “Looks good. But I don’t trust it, I don’t
know why”. Not being able to articulate the reasons behind a correct decision is
a known indication of guesses based on intuition [27, 36].
Note that this observation is also supported by the relatively weaker corre-
lation between the risk perception scores and the security scores of non-techies
compared to those of techies and experts. Although such a correlation in no
way implies a causality relationship between the two scores, it shows that for
experts, a higher risk perception is associated with higher security, but much less
so for non-technical participants. That is, non-techies base their decisions on
uninformed guesses. When their intuition is “trained” by exposure to a certain
type of attack (e.g., regular email scams), they do manage to mitigate the at-
tack. However, when the attack is something they have not regularly seen (e.g.,
a session fixation attack), they fail.
The weak correlation between the participants’ perception and their actions
sometimes manifests itself in the exact opposite way as well. For example, one
of the participants flagged a link to a blog with a script injection attack as being
“Most probably dangerous”, but decided to click on it anyway. The reasoning was:
“It is a blog. I would probably click anyway.”. While the participant understood
that there was something wrong with this URL, she could not understand and
assess the severity of the threat, and was not aware of the possible consequences
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of her actions.
Our experiments confirm the general intuition that security training is the
most effective method for reducing the risk posed by Internet threats. The more
users are familiar with a threat, the higher their security awareness becomes. This
is further supported by the correlation between familiarity of participants with
the 15 internet attack-related terms we presented them, and their security and
risk perception scores. Although it is unrealistic to expect an average Internet
user to have the motivation to learn and understand security concepts, based
on the feedback we received about our online security test platform, we believe
that security games and online test platforms that are tailored towards non-
technical people in order to familiarize them with common attack patterns (e.g.,
such as PhishGuru and Anti-Phishing Phil [42, 49] for anti-phishing training) are
required. Such testing systems could help achieve a similar effect to the one we
observed in the email-based attack tests. In fact, general psychology literature
also supports the idea that intuition could be “taught” by repeated experience,
and also by virtual simulations [36, 48].
6.2 Size Matters
When the participants did not have the necessary technical knowledge to make
an informed decision for a test and had to rely on their intuition, a very common
trend was to make a guess based on the “size”, the “length”, or the “complexity”
of artifacts.
In the web-based attack tests, for example, a benign Amazon link was labeled
as malicious by non-technical participants based on the fact that the URL con-
tained a crowded parameter string. Some of the comments included: “Too long
and complicated.”, “It consists of many numbers.”, “It has lots of funny letters.”
and “It has a very long name and also has some unknown code in it.”. Many of
these participants later said they would follow a malicious Paypal phishing URL
because “It is simple.”, “Easy to read.”, “Clear obvious link.” and it has a “Short
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address”. One participant further argued that “This is not dangerous, address is
clear. [Amazon link] was dangerous because it was not like this.”.
Interestingly, in some cases, the non-technical participants managed to avert
attacks thanks to this strategy. For example, a number of participants concluded
that a Facebook post containing a code injection attack was dangerous solely on
the grounds that the link was “long” and “confusing”.
Analogously, in the file sharing tests, the responses based on intuition mainly
relied on arguments about the file size. For example, the participants who did not
understand how BitTorrent works judged torrents merely on their expectations of
a full-length movie’s size. These participants often made misinformed decisions
such as discrediting a 700MB RAR archive as being malicious as the size of the
movie had not decreased after the compression (note that movie files are already
heavily compressed), or marking a 790KB file as correct since it referred to a
very old movie from 1922. In another example, several participants thought that
a 70MB file could be a full 90 minute high-quality movie.
Again, these results underline the importance of a proper security training. In
fact, when users are not able to make an informed decision about a possible threat,
they fall back on judging the situation based on often misleading characteristics,
such as an item’s size and complexity.
6.3 Loud and Clear Warnings
The responses from participants in the general security warnings test suite demon-
strate that warnings and alerts which are stated in simple, yet very direct terms
are considerably more successful in conveying the associated risk. Also, it is
useful to include intimidating visual cues into the alerts. For example, Firefox’s
blacklisted website warning, which clearly states in a frame with a red back-
ground (which again resides on a black background) that the page in question is
an “attack page”, was very effective.
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Surprisingly, we also observed similar effects in the BitTorrent file sharing
tests. That is, many participants believed that a perfectly legitimate search result
we presented them was malicious content because it contained a “skull icon” next
to the torrent name. Ironically, this icon indicates that the file was uploaded by
a trusted Pirate Bay user. Similarly, in the isoHunt tests, several participants
were disturbed by the “red font” used when listing some of the trackers, which
was completely benign.
In line with the experiments of Sunshine et al. [53], the invalid SSL certificate
warning we showed our participants was not very persuasive with its ordinary
color theme and vague statement: “This connection is untrusted”. Clearly, warn-
ings need to be loud and clear in communicating the risk of a wrong decision by
the user. In the case of Firefox, even though the warning attempts to inform
users that their connection to the website could be tampered with, non-technical
users who are completely oblivious to the consequences of a man-in-the-middle
are not disheartened by this explanation.
Our findings support the idea that security warnings should be designed with
an alarming look-and-feel. They need to express the impending threat clearly,
and avoid a formal description of the issue. For example, instead of saying: “This
website’s identity cannot be verified”, we believe that a message such as “This
website is probably fake and it can steal any information you enter!” would be
more effective.
6.4 URL Shortening Services and Tools
Our tests indicate that none of the non-technical participants attempted to verify
the destination of a shortened URL (in our case, a TinyURL). As explained in
Section 5.3.1, the majority of the non-techie group was not aware of the fact
that a shortened URL could link to any destination on the web. Rather, they
thought that TinyURL was the website that actually hosted the content. Even
those participants who were aware of the risks stated that they did not know how
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to verify the destinations of these links.
A wide variety and number of URL shortening services are available on the
Internet today. Their frequent use in social networks such as Twitter make them
ubiquitous. Unfortunately, the prevalence of shortened URLs also make them an
effective way to distribute malware and lure users into scams. A recent study by
Grier et al. [33] states that over 2 million links posted on Twitter point to attack
pages and that through the use of nested URL shortening, blacklisting solutions
can be circumvented. Our results support the fact that non-technical users are
easily fooled by shortened URLs in practice.
There exists several online services (e.g., [3, 9]), and extensions for popular
browsers (e.g., [2, 16]) that offer shortened URL expansion capabilities. While
these tools would definitely help technically inclined people assess the risk before
following a shortened URL, our experiments show that they are ineffective for
non-technical users who do not have a firm grasp of the technology behind URL
shortening.
Analogous to the recent integration of website blacklists and phishing detec-
tion heuristics into popular browsers (e.g., the anti-phishing features in IE as of
Version 7), we believe that URL expansion and threat detection capabilities (e.g.,
[8]) need to be integrated into browsers as soon as possible.
6.5 Trick Banners
In the interactive tests featuring reproduced download websites, the false click
rates for non-techies were considerably higher compared to experts. In 5 of the
6 tests, more than half of the non-technical participants clicked on a banner
instead of the real link to download the item in question. That is, even if these
participants were able to differentiate between a legitimate and a malicious search
result displayed by the file sharing website, they still would not have managed to
complete the download successfully.
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Using deceptive banners to trick Internet users into visiting a website is a
well-known advertisement strategy [54]. However, there have also been recent
attacks on the advertisement networks of popular websites where attackers have
legitimately bought banner space [55, 57, 60] or exploited bugs in ad servers (e.g.,
such as a recent attack on The Pirate Bay [58]). In such attacks, the attackers
typically use banners to serve malware. Additionally, some malware have utilized
trick banners for committing fraud [59]. Our study empirically confirms that trick
banners are very effective (attack) techniques in influencing the click behavior of
non-technical users. From a user’s point of view, a possible defense technique
in dealing with such tricks would be utilizing ad-blockers (e.g., [1]). Hence, it is
important to inform and train users about the use of such tools, especially when
visiting certain classes of websites.
6.6 Second Authentication Channels
We have shown in Section 5.3.4 that experts performed significantly better than
non-techies in the online banking test suite. Moreover, even though usage of a
second authentication channel significantly improves the chances of realizing an
attack, none of the non-technical participants who used a second authentication
channel detected our simulation of a man-in-the-middle attack. Combined with
the fact that 6.5% of the non-technical participants who didn’t use a second
authentication channel noticed an attack was taking place, we can argue that
second authentication channels may even enhance the chance of success of an
attack by inducing a false sense of security in the technically unsophisticated
users, let alone prevent attacks. Further studies on this subject are needed to
prove or disprove this point.
This is also in line with our observations in Section 6.4. Just as online ser-
vices and browser extensions that offer shortened URL expansion capabilities
help technically inclined people while they are ineffective for non-technical users,
second authentication channels help technically competent people while failing to
help those without the necessary technical knowledge. This once again proves the
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importance of a proper security training in mitigating attacks on the internet. As
long as users stay security-unaware, it is impossible for security tools to achieve
their full potentials.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis study, we describe an experiment platform for observing the behav-
ior of users when they are confronted with typical benign and malicious interac-
tion scenarios on the Internet. We present the results of a study we conducted
on 164 Internet users who possessed diverse backgrounds and varying degrees of
computer security knowledge. Our results empirically confirm the general intu-
ition that security training has a considerable positive impact on a user’s ability
to make correct security decisions and assess risks. This observation especially
holds when the threats involve technically complex attacks. The thesis also shows
that for relatively simpler and common threats (e.g., well-known e-mail scams),
non-technical users can exhibit comparable performance to knowledgeable users
by solely depending on their intuition and past experience (i.e., there is a training
effect).
We observed that many users consider unusual “size” and “length” charac-
teristics of URLs and downloaded files as indicators of risk. These users are
often highly susceptible to attack strategies that exploit shortened URLs, raw
IP addresses, and trick banners. We also observed that clear and intimidating
warning screens are more effective in conveying risk as opposed to vague technical
messages.
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Recently, security tools that aim to assist users in revealing the real des-
tinations of shortened URLs have been introduced, such as Longshore [8]. Our
findings suggest that such security services are largely ineffective for non-technical
users since they are not able to use them, or understand the concepts behind URL
shortening services. Likewise, we observed that second authentication channels
used during online transactions fail to enhance the security of non-technical users.
Although it is clear that the security problems on the Internet do not only
have a technical aspect (i.e., there exists the human factor), existing literature
is sparse, and there have not been many studies by the security community that
attempt to shed light on how Internet users are able to cope with current attack
vectors. We hope that this work will pave the way for similar works in the future.
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